By John Gerring
This publication units forth a comparatively novel thought of democratic governance, appropriate to all political settings during which multi-party pageant obtains. opposed to the present decentralist concept (deriving from Madison and Montesquieu), we argue that sturdy governance arises whilst political energies are centred towards the guts. parts needs to be reconciled to ensure that this means of accumulating jointly to happen. associations needs to be inclusive they usually needs to be authoritative. We seek advice from this mixture of attributes as "centripetal." whereas the idea has many capability functions, during this booklet we're involved basically with national-level political associations. between those, we argue that 3 are of basic significance in securing a centripetal form of democratic governance: unitary (rather than federal) sovereignty, a parliamentary (rather than presidential) govt, and a closed-list PR electoral approach (rather than a single-member district or preferential-vote system). We try the effect of those associations throughout quite a lot of governance results.
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Extra info for A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance
On SNTV, see Bowler and Grofman (2000). On STV, see Bowler and Farrell (1991). On the distinction between effective and ineffective open-list systems, see Katz (1986). 83333in April 12, 2008 Part One: Causal Mechanisms Fifth Republic serve as prime examples. Even so, it seems likely that, ceteris paribus, closed-list PR systems foster stronger parties. Moreover, closed-list PR is most effective in fostering strong parties where barriers to party building are most severe, that is, in polities that are new, economically underdeveloped, or heterogeneous (divided along tribal, ethnic, religious, linguistic, or geographic lines).
This is how legislatures were originally envisioned in eras prior to party organization. That they did not remain in this protean state is testament to constituents’ desires to have a hand in the choice of government. But in order to make this choice real – in order to understand the options available and to enforce the MP’s pledge – party organization is necessary. To vote for a Labour member in Britain is to vote for an MP who is pledged to vote for the Labour Party leader as the next prime minister, and who will be punished if she fails to do so.
All other things being equal, we expect this loyalty to be greater where there are more choices and where each of the available (viable) choices is more coherent. Internal coherence and external differentiation tend to characterize party systems in PR polities. 16 15 16 Norris (2004: chapter six). Carlsson (1987: 201). Some of the strongest evidence for this proposition comes from studies that compare the behavior of legislators chosen under parallel list and district systems (Haspel et al. 1998; Lancaster 1986; Moser 2001: 117; Patzelt 2000: 38–9; Stoner-Weiss 2001: 401; Stratmann and Baur 2002).
A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance by John Gerring